A group-oriented access control scheme is proposed for P2P (peer to peer) networks. In the proposed scheme, authentication control, admission control and revocation control are used in order to provide security services for P2P networks. Moreover, the proposed scheme can simply and efficient establish share key between two members without interactions, therefore it can perform secure communications with them. The analysis of security and performance shows that the proposed scheme not only can realize authentication and secure communication, but also can easily and efficiently add new group members and revoke malicious group members. Therefore, it is more efficient, and more practical protocol for P2P networks.
A Group-oriented Access Control Scheme for P2P Networks 31 for P2P networks. We propose a group-oriented access control scheme in order to provide security services for P2P networks. The proposed scheme can provide admission control, revocation control, authentication control, and secure communication etc. Furthermore, the proposed scheme can simply and efficient establish share key between two members without interactions, therefore it can perform secure communications with them, so it is a more efficient, and more practical scheme in the environments of dynamic membership and no central-trusted authority.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the group-oriented access control scheme for dynamic group. In section 3, the security and properties of the proposed scheme are analyzed. Finally, the concluding remarks are given.
Proposed Scheme
The design idea of the proposed scheme is motivated by [1, 14] . The proposed scheme employs polynomial function as the basic means of constructing member authentication procedure in order to avoid the need for public key cryptography. The proposed scheme consists of following sections.
Network model
In order to enhance management, our system model uses group-oriented structure, that is, a P2P network is classed into a number of groups. In each group, exactly one distinguished member, who is called as the group head (GH), is responsible for establishing and organizing the group. Group heads have considerably more trusty, it may be the founding members of P2P network [14] . Group heads can communicate with each other directly and relay data between two groups; Group members can communicate with its group head directly and communicate each other directly in the same group. But the members in two different groups cannot directly communicate in our model.
Initialization
Let p, q be distinct large primes and q|(p-1), g be a generator which is an element of * p Z with an order q (i.e., ). (.) h is a secure one-way hash function. Assuming also GH i denotes a group head for group G i (i= 1,2,…,m); N n =(n 1 ,…,n n ) denotes a set of network members in G i . Each GH i and n i have respectively a pair of keys such as (
). In the initialization phase, let the system have a trusted dealer (TD). After initialization, TD is no longer needed. TD has also a pair of keys such as 
for each group member, and then encrypts (  ,
, and finally sends i Q to each group member. Where i ID is the public identifier of the group member.
, then publishes these as P2P network public information. , and decrypts i Q and validates (
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Authentication control
The processes of mutual authentication and between group members n i and n j for the same group and between two group heads are described in the following.
Authentication between group members:
(1) The group member n i chooses a random number r i,
If it holds, then n j can make sure that n i is a legitimate member and has established their share session key
, and verifies B'=B. If it holds, then n i can make sure that n i is a legitimate member and has established their share session key k ij = h(  , f(ID i ,ID i )). They can securely communicate each other.
Authentication between group heads:
(1) The group head CH i chooses a random number
, and sends ( W,CH, t i ) to the group head CH j .
, and verifies W=W'. If it holds, then CH j can make sure that CH i is a legitimate group head and has established their share session key
, and verifies E=E'. If it holds, then CH i can make sure that CH j is a legitimate member and has established their share session key K ij = h(  ,c(CH i ,CH j )). They can securely communicate each other.
Admission control
In this section, the admission control is described. If a prospective member wishes to join the group in order to access the network resources, he must obtain the group head approving admission. The admission control involves following steps:
(1) A prospective member n new broadcasts joining request message containing his public key y new , the group name, and timestamps etc. to group head.
(2) The group head GH i verifies n new the joining request, and computes 
If they hold, the new member n new is added into the group and obtains his partial secret share parameters
Revokcaiong control
When GH i detects that some group members have misbehaving and malicious actions such as providing poor service etc., then the malicious members will be revoked from the group as following way. Assuming a group member n B will be revoked.
( 
and publishes [(  , w j , Therefore, the revoked user n B cannot recover the secret key  , thus he cannot pass authentication with other non-revoked members since using secret key  in authentication process (see section C). Therefore the group member n B is revoked from the group.
Analysis

Correctness
is constructed using t-1 non-revoked group member's (ID i ,
) and a point (  ,y) such
Proof: According to Lagrange interpolation know:
Given a set of t data points such as (ID i ,
) and (  , y), where no two ID i are the same and
in the Lagrange form is a linear combination as following
Security Analysis
(1) The authentication control can guarantee that only legal group members can access the group resources.
Each legal group members have secret keys (  , ) (x k i ) and can derive the valid authentication message A or B (see section C). However, an illegal group member will not be able to easily forge a valid authentication messages since they do not obtain secret keys (  , ) (x k i ), thus they cannot pass the authentication between group members, therefore the illegal group members cannot access the group resources.
(2) The proposed scheme can withstand a forgery attack. Because  and ) (x k i are generated by GH i , and encrypted and transferred to each legal group member, so an illegal group member cannot obtain the secret keys (  ,k i (x)), thus they cannot generate valid authenticated messages to pass authentication. If a legal group member leaks secret key  to an illegal group member, then the illegal group member cannot also pass authentication since he does not know secret key
. If a legal group member n i leaks secret keys  and ) (x k i to an illegal group member, the illegal group member must masquerade the legal member n i in order to pass authentication since the authentication message includes the two authenticated member's identifier ID i
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(see section C). If the illegal member generates the authentication message using his identifier, the authentication message is easily detected since
. So he only can masquerade the legal member n i in order to pass authentication. However, any legal member does not want other member to fake himself, therefore any legal group member cannot leak their secret keys  and ) (x k i to any illegal group member.
(3) The proposed scheme can resist the reply attack. In our scheme, a random number r i or r j is used one time when the group members mutually authenticate, so it can resist the reply attack.
(4) The proposed scheme can safely communicate. When a group member passes the authentication procedure with other member, a shared key k ij = h(  ,f(ID j ,ID i ))has already established between them. The shared key between the two members is pair-wise, so it is used to safely communicate between the two members since the shared key is only know to two members. Moreover, because each shared key is only know to two members who established it, even if an attacker compromised member knows, he can only know what the compromised member knows, but not the shared keys between other non-compromised members. Hence, the security of the entire P2P network is not compromised.
(5) Security of the scheme is based on the discrete logarithm assumption and polynomials as long as the attacker is no allowed to corrupt more than (t-1) group members in a group. This is because an a attacker who corrupts at most (t-1) group members can only obtain at most (t-1) share polynomials that are less than a threshold t.
In other hand, obtaining the secret share of group members from public information (  z , j z ) are as difficult as solving the discrete logarithm problem.
Performance Analysis
(1) The proposed scheme has features with authenticating group members, adding new group members and revoking malicious group members (see sections C,D,E).
(2) The proposed scheme only needs to store two keys and a polynomial in each group member no matter how large the network size is.
(3) The scheme doesn't require any interaction between group head and group member when a new member is added and a malicious member is revoked. Three interactions are needed when two group members accomplish authentication each other.
(4) The computation cost for authentication phase is 4 hash function computations and 2 polynomial computations. The computation cost for adding a new member phase is 4 hash function computations and 2 polynomial computations; The computation cost for revoking group member phase is t modular exponent computations for a group head and a modular exponent computation for each group member.
Conclusion
This paper proposed a group-oriented access control scheme for P2P networks. The proposed scheme provides an efficient authentication and secure communication for group members. Member joining or removal is also simple and quick. Moreover, the proposed scheme also analyzes security and performances and shows that the scheme is secure and practical for P2P networks.
